by Dan Hughes
This document:
C. W. Solbrig, L. J. Ybarrondo, and R. J. Wagner, IDAHO NUCLEAR CODE AUTOMATION: A Standardized and Modularized Code Structure, Nuclear Safety Development Branch, Idaho Nuclear Corporation, March 1971.
which appears to be prepared for presentation at a Conference, lays out the Big Picture of the Grand Scheme of Things for the Idaho Nuclear Code Automation (INCA) system of Safety Analysis Computer Codes (SACCs).
The Abstract reads:
ABSTRACT
This paper presents the Idaho Nuclear Code.Automation (INCA) system to be implemented during the course of the Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis Program being conducted for the Atomic Energy Commission as pert of the Loss-of-Fluid Test (LOFT) program.
Most of the knowledge, both analytical and experimental, concerning nuclear safety analyses will ultimately reside in computer codes. The value and reliability of this knowledge depends upon the accessibility and ease of use of these codes. Some of the problems encountered in the present generation of nuclear safety codes are (1) difficulty in interfacing codes, (2) inconsistency between codes, (3) long running time, to ensure stability, and (4) overemphasis on empirical correlations. This document describes a comprehensive plan for developing the third generation of nuclear safety codes with an integrated ^ode automation system that will alleviate these difficulties.
And the Conclusions:
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The system discussed provides two fundamentally attractive advantages to the AEC and the nuclear industry: (1) it will alleviate many of the past problems and errors in design and safety analyses and prevent their recurrence in present and.future analyses, and (2) it will provide sound technical retioiale for answering the ever present questions raised by the industry, the AEC, and the public on the conservatism built into analyses.
History has proven that we were on exactly the right path.
Olde Camp NRTS 